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Abstract
Multimarket contact (MMC) research establishes a positive relationship
between MMC and firm-in-market level prices and margins, supporting the
mutual forbearance hypothesis that firms confronting one another in multiple
markets tacitly collude. This article proposes that the MMC dynamics
generating short-term firm-in-market level advantages paradoxically undermine firm-level performance over the long term. Examining recursive relationships traversing levels of analysis, I integrate a distinctive competencies
perspective with the prevailing positional advantage perspective on MMC. At
the firm level, I contend that MMC undermines competence development.
At the population level, I propose that MMC attenuates the concentration
stability upon which forbearance rests, such that flurries of intense rivalry
punctuate extended periods of mutual forbearance. For firms exposed to the
competence depleting influences of MMC, punctuated forbearance threatens
performance. The competence depletion and punctuated forbearance hypotheses here advanced promise to sensitize future research efforts to MMC’s
adverse strategic implications.
Organization Management Journal (2011) 8, 88–104. doi:10.1057/omj.2011.13
Keywords: strategic management; competitive dynamics; multimarket contact (MMC)

Introduction
Firms are in multimarket contact (MMC) when they confront one
another simultaneously in multiple geographic or product markets.
Edwards (1955) provided theoretical insight into the dynamics and
consequences of MMC over half a century ago with his mutual
forbearance hypothesis. Firms with numerous multimarket rivals,
argued Edwards, recognize that a competitive action taken in one
market might invite punitive counter-attacks not only in that
market, but in other markets as well. A firm considering a price
decrease in one of its products must weigh the potential for price
war contagion across numerous product lines. The prospect of
escalating rivalry encourages firms with high levels of MMC to
treat one another with competitive restraint. Edwards termed this
inter-firm competitive restraint “mutual forbearance.” Empirical
work in MMC lends strong support to the mutual forbearance
hypothesis. Studies suggest that MMC dampens inter-firm rivalry
in a wide range of contexts, including the banking (Heggestad and
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Rhoades, 1978; Barnett et al., 1994; Fuentelsaz and
Gomez, 2006; Coccorese and Pellecchia, 2009),
savings and loan (Haveman and Nonnemaker,
2000), software (Young et al., 2000), personal
computer (Kang et al., 2010), cement (Jans and
Rosenbaum, 1997; Ghemawat and Thomas, 2008),
hotel (Fernandez and Marin, 1998), hospital (Boeker
et al., 1997), insurance (Greve, 2008), cellular
telephone (Parker and Roller, 1997; Busse, 2000)
and newspaper (Fu, 2003) industries. No line of
business, however, has been the focus of more
MMC research than the airline industry, where
researchers identify forbearance effects in the form
of higher prices (Evans and Kessides, 1994),
increased revenue per passenger seat mile (Gimeno
and Woo, 1996; Gimeno, 1999), wider price-cost
margins (Singal, 1996; Gimeno and Woo, 1999),
and lower entry and exit rates (Baum and Korn,
1996, 1999).
The preponderance of the MMC literature highlights tactically desirable forbearance effects – like
higher prices and margins – accruing to markets
occupied by rivals that meet each other in numerous other markets. However, a recent study
uncovers forbearance effects that hint at a more
complicated picture of MMC’s strategic implications. In a 2009 Academy of Management Journal
piece, Jeffrey Prince and Daniel Simon find a
negative relationship between MMC and service
quality in the form of airline on-time performance.
This finding begs a very fundamental – yet
currently unaddressed – question: how does MMC
affect long-term firm performance? If MMC affects
behaviors along nonprice competitive dimensions
such as service quality, it may not be warranted
simply to assume that collusion in short-term
pricing in particular markets necessarily translates
into stronger long-term, firm-level performance.
To clarify why not, let us consider a hypothetical
example involving two firms operating in contexts
with different degrees of MMC. Firm A operates in
geographic market X against competitors that it
does not meet in multiple other geographic markets.
Firm B operates in geographic market Y against
competitors that it does confront in multiple other
geographic markets. All other things being equal,
Firm B operates in a context that is more favorable
to short-term financial performance. Whereas
competition compels Firm A to keep prices
low and product/service quality high, mutual
forbearance enables Firm B to charge higher prices
and, in line with the recent Prince and Simon
(2009) findings, cut costs related to the delivery

of product/service quality. In the short term,
therefore, we can expect Firm B to enjoy greater
profitability than firm A. Over an extended time
period, however, the context in which Firm B
operates may undermine that firm’s competitiveness relative to Firm A. Subjected to less competitive pressure to deliver high-quality products and
services, Firm B will gradually lose the ability to
deliver quality, relative to Firm A. Confronted by
highly competitive rivals, Firm A experiences greater pressure than Firm B to search for and to learn
new and better ways of satisfying customers.
Additionally, because Firm A is not constrained
by the interconnectedness and interdependencies
that develop between Firm B and its multimarket
rivals, Firm A is more likely than Firm B to innovate
new and unique competencies, products, and
services. The atrophying of Firm B’s search, learning, and innovation capabilities will not undermine
the firm’s financial performance as long as it
confronts only mutually forbearing multimarket
rivals. The munificent conditions created by tacit
collusion in market Y are likely to invite new
entrants eventually, however, either in the form of
newly founded firms or in the form of existing
firms entering from different markets. Should a new
entrant or entrants indeed venture into market
Y, bringing customer-satisfying capabilities and
competitive intent sharper than those honed by
existing multimarket rivals, Firm B’s atrophied
competencies will be exposed. In terms of financial
performance, Firm B will fare poorly in its newly
competitive environment relative to Firm A, which
has been steadily exposed to and hardened against
competition in market X.
The purpose of this article is to explore in depth
the dynamics sketched out in this hypothetical
example. Relationships are examined between
MMC and performance at levels of analysis above
(e.g., at the population level) and below (e.g., at
the firm level) the inter-firm level focused on by
existing work. At the firm level, I propose that
MMC undermines competence development in
two ways. First, MMC affects firm learning processes by dampening inter-firm rivalry. Firms are
less likely to perceive problems, to search for
solutions, or to learn by doing where inter-firm
rivalry is of relatively low intensity. Second, MMC
affects firm learning processes by heightening interfirm connectedness. MMC has a homogenizing
influence on constituent firms’ structures, strategies, routines, values, frames of reference, norms,
and expectations. Mimicry, myopia, and insularity
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develop within tight MMC cohorts, curtailing
attention to external innovative trends and
decreasing the likelihood that cohort members will
forge unique organizational competencies.
At the population level, I contend that the
inherently and uniquely tenuous nature of MMC
collusion exposes firm-level competence depletion
in the long run. Membership in MMC cohorts,
I explain, is much less stable than is membership in
single-market oligopolies. Because mutual forbearance is contingent upon the existence of stable
market concentration levels, the entrance of new
rivals into MMC cohorts entails variance in levels of
collusion. I argue that in populations of multimarket competitors, flurries of new entry and
intense rivalry might be expected to emerge in –
or punctuate – extended periods of mutual forbearance. Firms sound in competence maintenance and
development might deftly weather these patterns
of punctuated forbearance. For firms exposed at
length to the competence depleting influences of
MMC, however, punctuated forbearance poses an
acute threat to firm performance. In other words,
firm performance suffers when the firm-level consequences of MMC (e.g., competence depletion)
converge with the population-level consequences
of MMC (e.g., punctuated forbearance). Figure 1
illustrates how MMC relates to firm performance
across time and levels of analysis.
I begin by tracing MMC theory’s focus on shortterm, market-specific benefits to its roots in oligopoly theory. As accurate as the prevailing perspective
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concentration level facilitates mutual recognition
of competitive interdependence (Adams, 1974),
which in turn fosters tacit collusion and dampens
rivalry. MMC theory and research emerged as
scholars began to consider causes of collusion
beyond single-market settings. From the start, the
research question motivating this literature has
been whether inter-firm relationships spanning
multiple markets promote mutual recognition of
extended interdependence (Areeda and Turner,
1979). The research model’s prevailing outcome
of interest – tacit collusion – is the raison d’etre of
the antecedent construct lending the MMC literature its name. Rather than ask, “what firm, interfirm, and population level outcomes derive from
multimarket contact?” scholars began by asking,
and for the most part have continued to ask, the
more limited question, “does multimarket contact
facilitate tacit collusion?”
While narrow in scope, the latter question is
theoretically grounded. Edwards (1955) specified
the theoretical basis for expecting MMC to foster
collusion. Edwards noted that firms confronting
one another across multiple markets recognize
the potential for a competitive attack to draw a
retaliatory response, not only in the attacked
market, but also at other points of contact. MMC
thereby magnifies the expected retaliatory costs
of initiating an attack, providing firms a strong
incentive to withhold first-mover competitive
actions (Karnani and Wernerfelt, 1985). As a result,
firms recognizing their extended interdependence should tend to “mutually forbear” (Edwards,
1955), or tacitly collude in the pursuit of rivalry
reduction.
Empirical studies generally support Edward’s
mutual forbearance hypothesis. Extant research
proceeds along three distinct levels of analysis
(Gimeno and Jeong, 2001). First, I/O economics
scholars conceptualize MMC as a market characteristic, measuring the overall degree of MMC among
firms serving a focal market. Feinberg (1985), for
example, finds a positive relationship between
industry-wide measures of MMC and industry-wide
price-cost margins. Evans and Kessides (1994) and
Singal (1996) conclude that the average number
of external contacts between airlines in a given
route positively affects fare levels in that route. Jans
and Rosenbaum (1997) find that cement prices
correlate with geographic market MMC levels.
While I/O economics researchers conceptualize
and measure MMC as a market characteristic,
management scholars approach MMC directly as a

characteristic of the relationships among firms
(Gimeno and Jeong, 2001). Within the management literature, in turn, MMC is treated at two
distinct levels of analysis. Most research approaches
MMC at the firm-in-market level of analysis,
measuring the level of cross-market contact that
a firm has with incumbents in a focal market. For
example, Boeker et al. (1997) find a negative
relationship between the extent to which a hospital
meets focal market competitors in other markets
and that hospital’s likelihood of exiting the focal
market. Gimeno and Woo (1996, 1999) show that
an airline’s MMC with incumbents in a given
route tends to increase the prices charged by that
airline in that route, while Prince and Simon (2009)
find that airline-in-route MMC levels relate negatively with on-time performance. Baum and Korn
(1996) also find that airline-in-route MMC levels
tend to mute rivalry, but the authors use market
entry and exit as dependent variables reflecting
levels of collusion. Other management scholars
conceptualize and measure the construct at the
dyadic level of analysis. Rather than measure MMC
between all firms in a given market (market level),
or measure MMC between a focal firm and all
incumbents in a focal market (firm-in-market
level), dyadic research seeks to capture an overall
level of MMC between two firms across all of the
markets in which the two meet. Baum and Korn
(1999), for example, find that the MMC between
two airlines across all of the markets in which they
meet bears an inverted “U-shaped” relationship
with market entry and exit, while Korn and Baum
(1999) examine antecedents to dyadic MMC.
Cumulatively, empirical work in MMC sheds
considerable light on the extent to which crossmarket contact between firms affects their competitive behavior toward one another. However,
existing MMC theory and research skirt perhaps
the central question pertinent to any topic in the
strategy field: how does the phenomenon under
investigation contribute to firm failure or to firm
success? (Porter, 1991). Grasping the relationship
between MMC and firm performance entails consideration of interactions between multiple outcomes over an extended period. Existing studies
of the MMC-rivalry relationship assume fixed
firm competencies along with stable and high
market concentration levels. Is it safe to assume,
however, that multimarket relationships between
firms do not systematically affect firm and population attributes? A multilevel model of MMC must
explore how MMC influences competencies and
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concentration levels over time, while considering
feedback loops crossing levels of analysis (Porter,
1991). The remainder of this article lays the
groundwork for such a multilevel model of MMC.

Firm-level effects of MMC: competence
depletion
This section examines firm-level effects of MMC.
I first analyze ways in which dampened inter-firm
rivalry – an established outcome of MMC – might
undermine competency development by affecting
firm learning processes. Analysis here integrates
content from the literatures on problemistic search,
Red Queen evolution, path dependence, the
exploration-exploitation trade-off, and competitive
experience. Subsequently, I explore how heightened inter-firm connectedness constrains firm
learning processes. Drawing on the institutional
and macrocultural literatures, I argue that close
inter-firm familiarity fosters debilitating tendencies
toward mimicry, myopia, and insularity. Finally,
drawing on opportunity cost logic, I consider how
the pursuit and maintenance of MMC may encourage firms to make resource commitments that
compromise the quality and variety of their
competencies.
Dampened inter-firm rivalry
Former Quaker Oats CEO Bill Smithburg quipped
in 1995, “Competition is a way of life. If you don’t
have a really tough competitor, you ought to invent
one” (Sellers, 1995). Smithburg’s comment reflects
the widespread belief that competition promotes
excellence. The “vague suspicion that competition
is the enemy of sloth” (Caves, 1980: 64) is cardinal
to economic theory. Viable competitors motivate
firms to reduce costs, improve products, and stay
abreast of technological change (Porter, 1985: 206;
1991). Porter’s extensive study of national competitive advantage indicates a strong relationship
between the vigor of domestic rivalry and the
persistence of competitive advantage in an industry
(Porter, 1990: 117–122). Numerous I/O economics
studies report positive relationships between competitive intensity and such competency-related
outcomes as efficiency, total factor productivity,
product/service quality, marketing spending, and
R&D intensity. For example, high levels of concentration (and thus low levels of competitive intensity) correlate with reduced technical efficiency
(Caves and Barton, 1990; Caves, 1992), diminished
total factor productivity (Nickell et al., 1992), lower
total factor productivity growth (Nickell, 1996),
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decreased service quality (Mazzeo, 2003), and
decreased product quality (Banker et al., 1998).
If rivalry reduction deriving from high concentration depletes competencies, then it is reasonable
to ask whether rivalry reduction deriving from
MMC depletes competencies as well. Indeed,
evidence suggests that MMC decreases the
resources firms devote to marketing functions
such as advertising, promotion, and sales force
deployment when introducing new products
(Shankar, 1999). Relationships between MMC and
firm decisions to allocate resources toward competency enhancement in other functional realms
remain unexplored. Theoretical grounds exist,
however, for proposing negative relationships
between MMC and a broad range of competencies
related to efficiency, differentiation, learning, and
innovation. The behavioral approach to the firm
expounds upon organizational decision-making
tendencies that help explain the link between
inter-firm competition and intra-firm excellence.
Degree of market competitiveness has powerful
implications for firm search, choice, and learning.
The competitive environment affects stimuli
to problemistic search (Cyert and March, 1963:
169–171); it shapes interpretations and outcomes
of past routines and actions, upon which present
actions are path dependent (Levinthal and March,
1993); and it influences the extent to which firms
undertake competitive actions and thus learn by
doing (Levitt and March, 1988). The dampening
of inter-firm rivalry, therefore, affects firm competencies through the mediating processes of problemistic search, path dependence, and competitive
experience.

Problemistic search. Problemistic search is search
stimulated by a problem and directed toward
finding a solution to the problem (March and
Simon, 1958: 194; Cyert and March, 1963: 169).
Work in both evolutionary economic theory (Nelson
and Winter, 1982: 173) and organizational evolution
(Tushman and Romanelli, 1985) echoes the
behavioralist observation that firm search tends to
be problem-oriented or failure-induced. Kim (1998)
and Winter (2000) show how organizational
performance crises, termed “internal activation
triggers” by Zahra and George (2002), intensify
firm efforts to achieve and learn new skills. Interfirm competition induces performance crises,
because the more intensely an organization
competes with others to achieve its objectives, the
more likely results are to fall short of expectations
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(Barnett et al., 1994). Given that competition
stimulates problemistic search (March, 1988), and
problemistic search enhances firm competencies,
it follows that competition enhances firm
competencies. Over time, this evolutionary
adjustment of the firm and its referent rivals
develops into a self-reinforcing process that has
been termed “Red Queen” evolution (Barnett and
Hansen, 1996; Barnett and Pontikes, 2008; Derfus
et al., 2008). Inter-firm competition triggers learning,
which increases an organization’s competitive
strength, which in turn triggers learning in its
rivals and thus stronger competitors, and
reciprocally so on.
Dampened rivalry, however, blunts the cycle of
Red Queen evolution. To the extent that MMC
dampens rivalry, it serves as a positional advantage
shielding the firm in the short-term from performance failure. Dampened rivalry conceals problems and thus curtails the search for answers.
Organizational success may make managers complacent with the status quo (Miller and Friesen,
1984) and blind them to the need for action (Lant
et al., 1992; Miller and Chen, 1994). In sum,
performance pressures and crises are less prevalent
in the absence of intense competition; problemistic
search is less operative in the absence of performance pressures; and organizational learning and
competence enhancement are less prevalent in the
absence of problemistic search.

Path dependence. Path dependence, like problemistic
search, helps explain how dampened inter-firm
rivalry mediates a negative relationship between
MMC and competence development. Whereas
the concept of problemistic search addresses firm
search proclivities, the concept of path dependence
emphasizes response behaviors, building on the
observation that organization actions are historydependent (Levitt and March, 1988). Path
dependence emerges in the extended absence of
problemistic search. Organizations give preferential
treatment to alternatives that represent continuation
of present programs over those that represent
change, so they do not search for or consider
alternatives to the present course of action unless
that present course is deemed unsatisfactory
(March and Simon, 1958: 194). In other words,
when an organization meets with success, its
managers tend to replicate and perpetuate
routines and actions they perceive as responsible
for that success. The organization’s dependence on
a historically successful, reliable path becomes

evident when its response to challenges proves
conditioned and constrained by that path (Arthur,
1989, 1994; Levinthal and March, 1993).
The potentially dysfunctional consequences of
path dependence manifest in a number of “traps”
jeopardizing competence development. A competency trap occurs when favorable performance
with a procedure leads an organization to accumulate more experience with it, thus keeping experience with alternate, potentially superior procedures
inadequate to make them rewarding to use (Levitt
and March, 1988: 322). The organization’s success
with learned competencies “traps” it into continued reliance on those competencies at the expense
of developing or adopting more optimal competencies. Firms caught in competency traps become
increasingly removed from other bases of experience and knowledge, exacerbating their vulnerability to environmental change (Levinthal and March,
1993: 102). Ahuja and Lampert (2001) specify
several types of competency traps. Familiarity traps
occur when the mutual positive feedback between
experience and competence renders the refinement
of familiar technologies and procedures preferable
to the exploration of new ones, and propinquity
traps result from the organization’s predisposition
to look for new solutions near old solutions when
exploration is pursued (Ahuja and Lampert, 2001).
Competency traps can emerge regardless of
environmental competitive intensity. Returns from
exploiting existing competencies are typically
more certain and less remote in time than are
returns from exploring new alternatives (March,
1991). However, environments characterized by
dampened inter-firm rivalry increase the likelihood
of competency traps. Where competition with
rivals is intense, a firm is more likely to accept the
uncertainty associated with exploration of new
competencies in order to achieve primacy in the
market. On the other hand, where tacit collusion
dampens the competition for primacy, firms are
more likely to opt for the reliability of exploitation
over the performance variance associated with
exploration (March, 1991). Additionally, in shielding the firm from performance failure feedback,
dampened rivalry promotes path dependence.
Managers attribute organizational success to
existing routines and technologies, decreasing their
propensity to learn or even consider alternate
procedures. If and when performance failure
confronts the firm, path dependence constrains
managerial responses to “doing more of the same.”
Levinthal and March (1993: 102) link market power
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to path dependence, noting the tendency among
firms with strong market positions to “impose their
policies, products, and strategies on others, rather
than learn to adapt to an exogenous environment.”
Environmental change beyond the firm’s control
exposes underdeveloped adaptive skills (Levinthal
and March, 1993: 102).
Path dependence may be exacerbated further
by the incentives that MMC creates for firms to
develop and maintain spheres of influence. As
Bernheim and Whinston (1990) explain by means
of formal economic modeling, MMC does not
facilitate collusive behavior where markets are
identical, firms are identical, and technology is
constant returns to scale. However, MMC does
facilitate collusive behavior where firms have
different production costs. Therefore, firms in
MMC have an incentive to specialize in – in other
words, to develop and maintain relative cost
advantages in – some subset of the markets in
which they operate. Where participants within an
MMC cohort claim such distinct and recognized
spheres of influence, collusive arrangements are
more readily facilitated (Bernheim and Whinston,
1990). This incentive toward specialization has
implications for firm competence development.
The positive feedback dynamics of path dependence are likely to orient firms strategically and
tactically toward markets and activities in which
they have excelled historically. Locked in to their
spheres of influence, they become less and less
likely over time to explore new competencies
outside their traditional specialties, and less and
less capable of adapting to new environmental
conditions arising exogenously.

Learning by doing. Dampened rivalry affects
competitive experience as well as search and
response. A critical element of organizational
learning is “learning by doing” (Levitt and March,
1988: 321–322). Firms develop expertise in those
activities that they perform repeatedly over time.
The more competitive actions a firm has taken in
the past, the wider its knowledge base will be,
and the more skilled, tactile, and efficient it will
become at taking future competitive action
(D’Aveni, 1994). A firm’s competitive repertoire is
affected by the range of its own past competitive
actions (Miller and Chen, 1994). Young et al.
(1996: 247) explain why the maintenance and
enhancement of a productive asset base requires
undertaking activities: “In building on asset
strengths, the cost of taking action is lower for

Organization Management Journal

the firm that has efficiencies derived from a rich
history of prior activity. Importantly, the firm
with a rich history of activity-derived learning not
only has lower costs of supporting superior
performance, but also is capable of undertaking
more activities in a given time period.” By
definition, firms engaged in dampened rivalry
pursue fewer competitive actions than do firms
experiencing intense rivalry. Indeed, studies show
that as MMC increases, firms prove less likely to
initiate tactical competitive attacks such as price
changes (Young et al., 1996; 2000) or new product
introductions (Kang et al., 2010). Dampened rivalry
reduces a firm’s competitive experience and skill
along such dimensions as differentiation, cost
efficiency, and launching competitive assaults.
Over time, the firm suffers not only in terms of
operational capabilities that help sustain technical
fitness, but as well in terms of the dynamic
capabilities critical to sensing and seizing opportunities and to shaping marketplace competition
(Teece, 2007).
As a consequence of the relationships explored
thus far between MMC, inter-firm rivalry, problemistic search, path dependence, competitive
experience, and firm competence development, I
propose the following:
Proposition 1: MMC decreases inter-firm rivalry.
Decreased inter-firm rivalry, in turn, negatively
affects organizational learning by decreasing
problemistic search, increasing path dependence,
and decreasing competitive experience. Organizational learning is positively related to competence development. Thus, inter-firm rivalry,
problemistic search, path dependence, and competitive experience mediate a negative relationship between firm-level MMC and firm-level
competence development.

Rate of innovation. The preceding discussion of
problemistic search, path dependence, and competitive experience as behavioral dynamics
mediating the relationship between dampened
rivalry and competence development pertains to a
potentially broad range of competencies, including
skills forming the basis of differentiation strategies,
cost leadership strategies, absorptive capacity,
and product and process innovation in general.
Innovative competencies merit further elaboration,
however. In particular, where distinct pre- and
post-innovation markets exist, competing lines of
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thought pervading extant theory complexify the
relationship between muted rivalry and innovative
competencies. Propositions are needed resolving
the countervailing tendencies toward competitioninduced innovation on the one hand and
Schumpeterian innovation on the other.
The managerial propensity toward problemistic
search informs the general expectation that weak
competition reduces the spur to innovative activity
(March and Simon, 1958: 203–207; Cyert and
March, 1963: 188–190). This view of competition
as a stimulant to innovation, argued over four
decades ago by Arrow (1962), finds support in
subsequent empirical studies. Geroski (1990) and
Blundell et al. (1995), for example, find that
concentration dampens innovative activity, while
Boone (2001) shows that innovation confers
more value to the firm when competition is
intense. Delbono and Denicolo (1990) show that
incentives to introduce cost-reducing innovations
are greater where firm decision variables are prices
rather than output levels. Since price competition
typically leads to higher output and lower prices
than output-level competition, the former can be
thought of as a more intense form of competition
(Bonanno and Haworth, 1998). Thus, the Delbono
and Denicolo study (1990) supports the position
that the incentive to innovate is greater under more
intense competition.
An alternate line of reasoning, associated with
Schumpeter (1942), maintains that concentration
rather than competition serves as a stimulus to
innovation. The Schumpeterian argument rests on
two points of logic. On the one hand, ex ante
market power possessed by a firm facing little
competition provides the firm with the financial
wherewithal to invest in risky innovation. Stable
cash flows render the firm capable of pursuing
innovation. The behavioralist approach reflects
this point of argument with the notion that “slack
innovation” may occur in firms with ample
resources (Cyert and March, 1963: 189). On the
other hand, ex post market power provides a firm
facing little competition powerful incentive to
make innovative investments. The firm does not
anticipate rents being competed away on the
post-innovation market (Schumpeter, 1942: 82–88).
The Schumpeterian perspective on innovation
and the view of innovation as competition-induced
represent countervailing logics, but the two are not
mutually exclusive. The influence of the opposing
dynamics on the overall relationship between
rivalry and rate of innovation is best captured by

disaggregating that relationship into the effect
that rivalry in the pre-innovation market has on
innovation and the effect that rivalry in the
post-innovation market has on innovation. Numerous studies linking seller concentration to R&D
intensity find an “inverted-U” shaped relationship
(Scott, 1993: 136). This pattern emerges because of
the ease with which price coordination is achieved
in post-innovation markets relative to the difficulty
with which coordination for R&D is achieved in
pre-innovation markets. Low levels of concentration mute rivalry in neither market. Thus, competitive incentives in pre-innovation markets are
counterbalanced by the likelihood of post-innovation rents being competed away. As a result,
innovation is relatively low. As concentration levels
rise, coordination is more easily obtained in postinnovation markets than in pre-innovation markets
(Scott, 1993). At moderate concentration levels,
therefore, intense competition in pre-innovation
markets continues to stimulate innovation while
dampened rivalry in post-innovation markets also
induces innovation. As a result, innovation rates
are highest at moderate levels of concentration.
Finally, as concentration levels further increase,
rivalry is dampened in pre-innovations markets as
well as post-innovation markets, removing one
innovation stimulant while perpetuating the other.
As a result, at high concentration levels, innovation
levels dip downward again.
The above logic supports the existence of an
“inverted-U” shaped relationship between MMC
and innovation in extended oligopolies similar
to the one found between concentration and
innovation in single-market oligopolies. The allocation of resources to innovation is greatest when
tacit collusion is powerful enough to dampen
rivalry on the post-innovation market, but not
powerful enough to dampen rivalry on the preinnovation market. Consequently, I propose the
following:
Proposition 2: Firm-level MMC bears an inverted
U-shaped relationship with rate of innovation,
and consequently with firm-level competence
development.

Heightened inter-firm connectedness
MMC heightens the connectedness as well as
dampens the rivalry between firms. The inter-firm
familiarity and dependence fostered by MMC have
important implications for firm learning processes.
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Integrating theory and research on mimetic isomorphism and macrocultures, I explore how MMC
inclines firms toward mimicry, insularity, and
myopia, to the detriment of long-term competence
development. Invoking the economic concept of
opportunity costs, I then contend that the
extended interdependence of firms in MMC orients
deployment of resources toward foothold commitments that potentially limit resource sharing opportunities, again with negative consequences for
competence development.

Mimetic isomorphism and macrocultures. The
psychological concept of social proof and the
sociological concept of information cascades
(Surowiecki, 2004) suggest that individuals base
decisions about their own behavior in part on
observed referent group behavior. Mimicry of this
stamp reflects not a conformist need for social
acceptance, but rather the rationale that “if others
are doing it, it must have value.” The institutional literature captures this dynamic at the
organizational level with the concept of mimetic
isomorphism, or firms’ tendency to respond to
uncertainty by modeling referent others (DiMaggio
and Powell, 1983). When firms face problems
with ambiguous causes or unclear solutions –
which they frequently do – they seek solutions
in the actions and organizing routines of other
firms they perceive dealing successfully with
similar problems. Mimetic isomorphic pressures
are strongest where the interconnectedness
(Oliver, 1991) and interdependence (DiMaggio
and Powell, 1983) between firms is highest. Firms
confronting one another across multiple markets
share a high degree of interconnectedness,
extended interdependence, and familiarity, such
that they should be strongly affected by the
homogenizing influence of mimetic isomorphism.
While institutional isomorphism can enhance firm
legitimacy and thus, in certain contexts, firm
success, mimetic isomorphism nevertheless works
counter to the development of unique organizational strategies, routines, and technologies
(Oliver, 1997).
The concept of macroculture, like the concept of
isomorphism, pertains broadly to the issue of
similarity between firms. Whereas institutional
theory examines the sources of homogenization
in structures and activities, however, the macroculture literature explores the existence and
outcomes of managerial perceptions of interorganizational similarities. Perceived similarities
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between firms derive from common values, frames
of reference, norms, and expectations (Cassidy
and Loree, 2001). A macroculture consists of “the
relatively idiosyncratic, organization-related beliefs
that are shared among top managers across
organizations” (Abrahamson and Fombrun, 1994:
730). A macroculture’s influence reflects the extent
to which organizations’ top managers share a
mutual perception of one another as close competitors (Abrahamson and Fombrun, 1994). MMC
fosters macrocultures (Cassidy and Loree, 2001)
because the more firms confront one another across
multiple markets, the more likely they are to
perceive one another as close competitors. The
familiarity that facilitates mutual forbearance
among MMC cohorts promotes, as well, managerial
perceptions of intra-group similarity in strategic
priorities and beliefs about competitive boundaries.
Strong macrocultures affect member firms’ strategic vision and decision making. Where a set of
competing firms confront one another repeatedly
in multiple domains, top managers tend to focus
on one another to the exclusion of firms, technologies, and modes of operating outside the group.
Thus, macrocultures are inertial in their tendency
to blind members to competitive opportunities and
threats originating beyond perceived competitive
boundaries (Abrahamson and Fombrun, 1994). This
strategic myopia weakens member firms’ adaptive
competencies. The learning literature strikes a like
note in its discussion of spatial myopia (Levinthal
and March, 1993), while the strategic group
literature similarly recognizes the tendency of
highly interconnected competitors to overly focus
attention on one another and away from outside
competitors (Peteraf and Shanley, 1997).
Macrocultures tend to blind members to knowledge sources beyond perceived competitive boundaries (Abrahamson and Fombrun, 1994). Firms
defining their competitive environment narrowly
operate in a sterile and homogeneous learning
environment (Miller and Chen, 1994). In curtailing
organizational attention to external innovative
trends, this strategic myopia decreases innovation.
Myopic effects of MMC with regard to innovation
are particularly significant in light of the emerging
literature on knowledge transfer effects of MMC.
Several studies find a positive correlation between
MMC and cross-citation of patents, suggesting that
MMC promotes knowledge transfer between participant firms (Cassidy and Loree, 2001; Scott, 2001;
Greve and Mitsuhashi, 2004). Myopic influences
on innovative rates and diversity, currently
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unexplored empirically, may offset or outweigh
within group positive effects on knowledge transfer
with between group negative effects on knowledge
exploration and acquisition.
The preceding discussion of institutional isomorphism and macrocultures informs the following:
Proposition 3: MMC increases inter-firm connectedness. Increased inter-firm connectedness,
in turn, negatively affects organizational learning
by increasing mimetic isomorphism and macrocultural myopia. Firm learning is positively
related to competence development. Thus,
inter-firm connectedness, mimetic isomorphism,
and macrocultural myopia mediate a negative
relationship between firm-level MMC and firmlevel competence development.

Foothold commitments. While isomorphic and
macrocultural processes reflect social dynamics
associated with inter-organizational connectedness, foothold commitments represent a form of
mimicry rooted in economic logic. I define
foothold commitment as the presence that a firm
maintains in a particular market at least partly for
the purpose of inducing or perpetuating mutual
forbearance. The mutual forbearance hypothesis
specifies the rivalry-muting consequences of the
retaliatory potential possessed by firms in MMC.
Both logic and empirical evidence suggest that
firms value the short-term benefits of muted rivalry
and, as a result, base market entry and exit
decisions at least in part on their desire to
establish or preserve mutual forbearance arrangements. Both Haveman and Nonnemaker (2000) and
Fuentelsaz and Gomez (2006), for example, find
that propensity to enter a given focal market first
increases, then decreases, as the firm’s level of
contact in other markets with incumbents in the
focal market increases. In other words, firms low
in MMC with incumbents are highly likely to
enter the incumbents’ focal market because they
are not yet highly exposed to retaliation, and
because they seek to raise their level of MMC to
the point that mutual forbearance can be
established with rivals. Once a firm establishes
a high level of MMC with incumbents, that firm
then proves less likely to enter the incumbents’
focal market because it is highly exposed to
retaliation. Additionally, several studies have
found that firms with high levels of MMC in a
given market are less likely to exit that market than

are firms with low levels of MMC (Barnett, 1993;
Baum and Korn, 1996; Boeker et al., 1997). These
results indicate that firms with high levels of
MMC value the rivalry-muting effects of mutual
forbearance and consequently hesitate to relinquish
those benefits. Forbearance considerations, therefore, entice firms to enter some markets they would
not otherwise enter, and to stay in some markets
they would otherwise exit (Stephan and Boeker,
2001).
The pursuit of mutual forbearance may act as an
incentive for firms to carefully consider specific
market attributes when making entry and exit
decisions. MMC does not facilitate collusive behavior where markets are identical, firms are identical,
and technology is constant returns to scale
(Bernheim and Whinston, 1990). Where differences
between markets cause firms to attach more
weight to future outcomes in some markets than
in others, however, MMC serves as a device for
shifting punishment power across markets. The
future seems more important than the present
where market growth is rapid (in comparison to
where market growth is slow) and where market
demand is low (in comparison to where market
demand is high). Where the future seems more
important, the consequences of punishment
(which are felt in the future) are high relative to
the immediate gains of defecting and breaking a
collusive arrangement. MMC facilitates the transfer
of enforcement power from rapidly to slowly
growing markets and from periods of low demand
to periods of high demand. Therefore, one of the
ways in which firms can enhance their ability to
sustain collusive outcomes in contexts of MMC
is by occupying counter-cyclical markets or
markets with different growth rates (Bernheim
and Whinston, 1990). Consequently, firms may
establish and maintain foothold commitments
in rapidly growing markets or in markets with
poorly correlated demand cycles partly for the
purpose of sustaining mutual forbearance.
The tendency of firms in MMC to base market
entry and exit decisions at least partly on their
desire to establish and preserve forbearance
arrangements may detract from their capacity to
locate and pursue internal resource sharing opportunities. Devoting resources and managerial
attention to foothold commitments diverts
resources and attention away from potential
resource-sharing opportunities in other markets.
This is not to suggest that foothold commitments
entirely replace or preclude firm pursuit of scope
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economies or other synergies; rather, I suggest that
at the margins, forbearance objectives may dilute
resource-sharing objectives. In short, forbearance
considerations may crowd out resource-sharing
considerations in scope decisions. A substantive
body of literature, in turn, supports the importance
of resource-sharing to competence development
(Prahalad and Hamel, 1990; Lengnick-Hall and
Wolff, 1999). Consequently, I propose the following:
Proposition 4: The more managerial attention
is devoted to establishing and preserving forbearance benefits deriving from MMC, the less
focused managerial attention is on entering and
remaining in markets with strong resourcesharing opportunities. Thus, foothold commitments mediate a negative relationship between
firm-level MMC and firm-level competence
development.

Population-level effects of MMC: punctuated
forbearance
MMC affects characteristics of firm populations
as well as attributes of member organizations. In
particular, the extent of MMC within a population
may influence concentration stability. Extended
oligopolies are more open systems and thus more
accessible to new entrants than are single-market
oligopolies, I contend. Additionally, firm-level
variety reduction and competence depletion deriving from MMC aggregates to the population level,
creating competitive vacuums that induce new entry.
The confluence of system openness and competitive vacuums may de-stabilize concentration levels
in MMC contexts, generating patterns of punctuated
forbearance in which convergent periods of
dampened rivalry are periodically interrupted by
rivalrous reorientations.
Semi-stability in concentration levels has powerful implications for the preservation of mutual
forbearance. The MMC literature’s focus on the
MMC-forbearance relationship should not obscure
the importance of concentration to the development of tacit collusion, in multimarket contexts
just as in single-market contexts. While oligopoly
studies explicitly operationalize market concentration far more often than do MMC studies, Scott
(1982, 1993) has shown that multimarket theory
collapses in the absence of high concentration
levels. In fact, in markets with low levels of
concentration, MMC is negatively associated with
firm profitability (Scott, 1982). The greater the
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number of firms confronting each other across
multiple markets, the more familiarity declines,
the more unwieldy coordination becomes, the
more difficult and costly monitoring defection
becomes, and the more mutual recognition of
competitive interdependence fades. Absent mutual
recognition of interdependence, tacit collusion
collapses and rivalry ensues. Persistently high
concentration levels, in sum, represent the foundation upon which the entire edifice of current
MMC theory rests. A potential causal relationship
between MMC and concentration destabilization
at the population level, therefore, is a matter of
critical importance to multimarket theory.

System openness
The persistence of high concentration in a singlemarket oligopoly is contingent upon sustained
barriers to entry in that market alone. Extended
oligopolies, on the other hand, are more open to
entry by virtue of their greater structural complexity. Each market occupied by a cohort of firms
engaged in multimarket competition must remain
highly concentrated in order for incumbents to
mutually recognize interdependence and monitor/
enforce coordination. Contact in one market
affects intensity of rivalry in another market (and
vice versa) if and only if concentration is – and
remains – high in both markets. A simple example
illustrates the greater system openness in extended
oligopolies relative to single-market oligopolies.
Consider two scenarios: a five-firm single-market
oligopoly, and a five-firm extended oligopoly in
which each of the five firms confronts each of
the other four firms in each of three markets. All
other things being equal, the probability of new
entry is three times higher in the MMC scenario
than in the single-market scenario, simply because
three markets are vulnerable to entry as opposed
to one.
The extent of MMC system openness is often
even greater than suggested by the simple five-firm,
three-market extended oligopoly example introduced above. A firm in MMC typically meets one
competitor in a certain set of markets, another
competitor in another set of markets that partially
but not fully overlap with the first, a third firm in
another set of markets that partially but not fully
overlap with the first and second, and so forth.
Partial overlap of market contact destabilizes concentration levels even further than full overlap.
Under conditions of partial overlap, entry into a
market in which a firm does not even operate can
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Five Firm, Five Market Extended Oligopoly

Figure 2

Partial overlap in extended oligopolies.

initiate a series of rivalrous actions and reactions
that reverberate to affect collusive arrangements in
markets in which the firm does operate. Consider,
for example, five firms that operate in three
markets each, confronting each other across five
markets such that each firm is in MMC with at least
two others. Figure 2 represents such a scenario.
Entry and subsequent decreases in concentration
in one market can undermine forbearance arrangements in a chain reaction down the line, potentially engulfing all five firms. In this scenario, fully
five markets are vulnerable to entry, or five times
the amount in a single-market oligopoly. Consequently, I propose the following:
Proposition 5: The large number of entry points
in extended oligopolies relative to single-market
oligopolies entails a higher probability of new
entry in the former than the latter. Thus, mutual
forbearance deriving from MMC is less stable and
enduring than tacit collusion in single-market
oligopolies.

Competitive vacuums
Firm-level effects of MMC express themselves
aggregately at the population level. As previously
discussed, muted rivalry, mimicry, and myopia
mediate reductions in the quality and variety of
organizational competencies. Over time, the
affected population of firms comprising a given
MMC cohort will begin to suffer from a fixed
and narrow capacity to meet customer wants. This
group condition might remain unnoticed in the
absence of new entrants. Ironically, however,
the homogeneity and atrophy characterizing the
population’s competencies induce the very new
entrants that expose the state of those competencies. While MMC may dampen rivalry between

involved firms, competition and competency
development are certain to proceed outside the
bounds of the MMC cohort. A portion of competency development outside the MMC cohort is
likely, eventually, to bear relevance to serving
the needs of customers of the firms in MMC.
Profitable discrepancies between the knowledge
and competencies possessed by those within
MMC networks and those outside MMC networks
are likely to be seized upon by entrepreneurs.
Competitive vacuums do not remain unfilled in
perpetuity. Consequently, I propose the following:
Proposition 6: MMC reduces the quality and
variety of competencies possessed by a population of firms, creating competitive vacuums that
ultimately induce market entry by new firms.

Punctuated forbearance
System openness and competitive vacuums combine to generate patterns of forbearance and rivalry
I term punctuated forbearance, borrowing from the
concepts of convergent periods and reorientations
enumerated in Tushman and Romanelli’s (1985)
punctuated equilibrium model of organizational
evolution. The punctuated equilibrium model
maintains that “organizations progress through
convergent periods punctuated by reorientations
which demark and set bearings for the next
convergent period” (Tushman and Romanelli,
1985: 173). Convergent periods consist of relatively
long time spans of incremental change and adaptation during which organizational structures, systems, controls, and resources are increasingly
co-aligned. Reorientations are relatively short
periods of discontinuous change during which
organizational attributes are fundamentally transformed toward a new basis of alignment (Tushman
and Romanelli, 1985). The framework embodied
by the punctuated equilibrium model of organizational evolution captures the dynamics I propose
among populations of firms in MMC. Prolonged
convergent periods witness increasingly collusive
and myopic co-alignment between firms, as
repeated interaction over time entrenches familiarity, interdependence, and forbearance norms.
Co-alignment within an MMC cohort slowly builds
competency gaps between the cohort and external
firms/entrepreneurs. Competitive vacuums operate
in conjunction with system openness to induce
reorientations – the “punctuation” in punctuated
forbearance. While convergent periods represent
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the forestalling of competition, reorientations
reflect its inexorability. Brief and infrequent, reorientations consist of new entry of sufficient scale
to undermine existing forbearance arrangements,
thus transforming the competitive landscape. The
frequency and magnitude of reorientations are
likely inversely related.

Joint firm- and population-level effects of
MMC: consequences for performance
The framework advanced in this article encompasses and reconciles, in the context of MMC, two
competing views on the source of above average
firm performance. One view, rooted in the structureconduct-performance paradigm of industrial organization, emphasizes the actions firms take to create
defensible positions against competitive forces
(Caves and Porter, 1977; Porter, 1980; Teece et al.,
1997). This “positional advantage” view is countered by a second major approach that regards
superior performance as the result of idiosyncratic
organizational attributes (Barnett et al., 1994). This
“distinctive competencies” or “resource-based”
perspective emphasizes the development of rare,
valuable, non-substitutable, and inimitable firm
capabilities and assets (Wernerfelt, 1984; Barney,
1991). Both perspectives, I contend, are necessary
to a dynamic, multilevel model of MMC. The
positional advantage view accounts for performance outcomes in the short-term, while the
distinctive competencies view is critical to understanding long-term firm performance.
The mutual forbearance hypothesis captures
the positional advantage conferred upon firms by
MMC. Mutually recognized interdependence fosters tacit collusion, which shields member firms
from competitive pressures. Empirical studies of
MMC reflect this positional advantage in findings
of higher prices (Evans and Kessides, 1994; Jans and
Rosenbaum, 1997) and fatter price-cost margins
(Hughes and Oughton, 1993; Singal, 1996; Parker
and Roller, 1997; Gimeno and Woo, 1999) at the
firm-in-market level. My framework recognizes
short-term positional advantages with propositions
one and two.
I depart from extant theory by integrating the
distinctive competencies perspective into consideration of performance outcomes. The distinctive
competencies view inherently orients attention
toward the long term. The processes mediating
reduction in competence quality and variety do
not generate immediate effects. Organizational
decision-making tendencies reflected in the
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concepts of problemistic search, path dependence,
experience, isomorphism, macroculture, and footholds are gradual, cumulative affairs. Additionally,
in the MMC context, positional advantage disguises
competency effects. Indeed, competence depletion
largely derives from the blunting of competitive
forces. Firm performance does not reflect competence depletion as long as mutual forbearance
persists. I have argued, however, that positional
advantage affects competencies, which recursively
affect positional advantage. The dissolution of
mutual forbearance exposes the competence depletion that it in part drove and from which it in part
died. The full cycle is not evident in the short term.
Competitive vacuums result from slowly developing competence gaps between firms internal and
external to the MMC network, and entrepreneurial
gap recognition and subsequent entry entail additional time. In sum, positional advantage in
MMC contexts contains the seed of its own
destruction, but time is necessary for the seed to
bear fruit. Consequently, I propose the following:
Proposition 7: Firm-level MMC is positively
related to short-term financial performance
and negatively related to long-term financial
performance.

Implications and conclusion
Implications for theory
The dynamic, multilevel perspective advocated in
this article has important implications for MMC
theory. By extending consideration of multimarket
issues outward in time and across levels of analysis,
my approach invites reevaluation of the bounds
of endogeneity in MMC theory. Excessively narrow
formulations dominate current research. Shortterm focus goes hand-in-hand with defining as
fixed and exogenous certain variables that might
well belong within MMC models. Future theoretical
efforts might build on my framework to explore
additional causal pathways involved in MMC
dynamics. One theoretical avenue in need of
further exploration is the integration of positional
advantage and distinctive competencies perspectives. Nuanced analyses informed by both views
promise to substantially enhance our understanding of cross-level, long-term recursive relationships
between market position and competencies. In
a more detailed sense, the potential exists for
theoretical refinement of particular relationships
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introduced in this article. For example, might
network theory or NK modeling shed additional
light on the “system openness” concept I discuss?
Might additional insights from behavioral or
economic theory, or from elsewhere, be applied
to analysis of the relationship between MMC and
firm-level competencies?

Implications for research
A multilevel model of MMC has numerous research
implications. Moving research forward entails
developing a firm-level MMC construct against
which firm performance may be examined.
Therefore, the need exists for operationalizing a
construct reflecting a firm’s overall orientation
toward MMC throughout its portfolio. The construct might, for example, be composed of three
dimensions: aggregate number of multimarket competitors that the focal firm confronts in a given
market; proportion of the focal firm’s competitors in
a given market that are multimarket competitors;
and degree of MMC that the focal firm has with
multimarket competitors. Measurement might be
indexed, such that a market-level MMC value
(based on the above categories–number, proportion,
degree) is assessed for the firm in each market in
which it operates, and then aggregated to the firm
level by scaling each market-level MMC value
according to the proportion of total firm revenues
(or profits) derived from the market in question.
Many other research opportunities arise from the
multilevel model proposed here. The competence
depletion and punctuated forbearance hypotheses
are in need of empirical testing. For example,
empirical work might test for relationships between
firm-level MMC and competence quality/variety
along such dimensions as rate/diversity of innovation, product/service quality, cost efficiency and
absorptive capacity. Another research opportunity
pertains to the relationship between firm-level
MMC and the existence of particular mediators.
For example, does evidence support the relationships I suggest between firm-level MMC and
isomorphism, path dependence, macrocultures, or
resource-sharing? At the population level, the need
exists for empirical studies pertaining to
the relationship between MMC, concentration,
and mutual forbearance. Is high concentration
really necessary, in every market occupied by
an MMC cohort, for mutual forbearance to
hold? Are there discernible patterns in concentration and collusion over time approximating the
convergent periods and reorientations comprising

punctuated forbearance? Finally, the role of
moderators remains conspicuously unaddressed.
What firm attributes (such as age or size) and
what industry/environmental characteristics (such
as dynamism or complexity) accelerate or decelerate competence depletion, and how do moderators
affect ease of entry and thus patterns of forbearance
punctuation?

Implications for practice
MMC is framed one-dimensionally by the current
literature as a positional advantage positively
associated with profit margins. This article paints
a very different picture. The principal implication
for top executives is that MMC should be
approached warily, as something of a poisoned
fruit. MMC does confer market power, but it should
not be regarded as a factor contributing to sustainable competitive advantage. Managers of firms with
postures high in MMC must be on guard against
the numerous tendencies toward competence
depletion associated with MMC. When making
scope decisions, executives should consciously
avoid pursuing forbearance benefits at the expense
of resource-sharing opportunities. Firms with a
multimarket orientation must stay attuned to the
potential for strategic myopia, and should scan
their environments beyond the bounds of their
MMC cohort for competitors, knowledge sources,
novel routines, and emerging technologies. Finally,
managers must avoid falling prey to the pathdependent tendencies arising from a multimarket
orientation, and where problemistic search is
curtailed, search should be routinized.
Conclusion
In this article I seek to expand MMC theory beyond
the relatively narrow temporal and causal focus it
currently possesses. I draw insights from behavioral
and economic theory to elaborate an approach
integrating positional advantage and distinctive
competencies perspectives on competitive advantage. The framework introduced here does not
contradict the mutual forbearance hypothesis, but
offers instead that collusive arrangements represent
but one stage in a broader, dynamic MMC cycle.
MMC forestalls rivalry, but competition is inexorable. Causal chains and feedback loops traverse
levels of analysis, such that market power influences competence development and competence
development recursively affects market power.
My attentiveness to part-whole relationships in
the form of firm-population dynamics, along with
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my argument that MMC market power contains the
seeds of its own destruction, evinces the dialectical
sensibilities motivating my approach. The framework I advance should not be interpreted as
deterministic, however. While I identify behaviorally and economically grounded tendencies that,
if unaddressed, are likely to surface in firms with
strong MMC orientations, my analysis remains
strategic in spirit. Managerial choice plays a critical

role in shaping the relationships between variables
that I propose. Indeed, my ultimate purpose is to
inform theory and research that better equips
managers to navigate multimarket contexts.
Considerable room remains for theoretical and
empirical contributions to multilevel MMC theory.
The propositions forwarded in this article are
designed to provide a foundation on which future
endeavors may build.
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